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Structural Cooperative Federalism 
Kate Glover* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article considers the status of cooperative federalism as a legal 
principle in Canadian constitutionalism. It argues that our understanding 
of cooperative federalism – often called the “modern form” of federalism 
in Canada1 – is enriched by looking to constitutional contexts beyond the 
division of powers. This article focuses on just one of those contexts, that 
is, it explores the lessons to be learned about cooperative federalism from 
the text and structure of Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982.2 
This article argues that Part V, which sets out the procedure for formally 
amending the Constitution of Canada, is an expression of cooperative 
federalism, indeed, a strong one. The amending procedure calls for 
coordinated action between federal and provincial legislative actors when 
amending the Constitution in relation to many of the country’s most 
constitutionally meaningful issues. Cooperative federalism both describes 
part of the vision of government that informs Part V and helps to explain the 
animating principles and procedural demands of Part V. An in-depth look at 
Part V supports the claim that cooperative federalism is not simply a matter 
of modern political practice or judicial interpretation, as the cases suggest, 
but rather is embedded in the architecture of Canada’s Constitution. After 
exploring this claim, this article then considers its implications for the 
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1 See e.g., Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 14, 
2015 SCC 14, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 693, at para. 147 (S.C.C.), affg [2013] J.Q. no 6676 (Que. C.A.) 
[hereinafter “Quebec (AG)”]; Goodwin v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), [2015] 
S.C.J. No. 46, 2015 SCC 46, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 250, at para. 33 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Goodwin”]; 
Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, 2007 SCC 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 42 
(S.C.C.), affg [2005] A.J. No. 21 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter “Canadian Western Bank”]. 
2 Constitution Act, 1982, Part V, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
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interpretation of sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.3 Noting 
that the meaning of the cooperative principle will continue to unfold in 
future cases, this article considers whether some duties of regard or good 
faith should attach when governments engage in co-operative legislative 
partnerships. 
Bringing the amending formula into the mainstream conversation on 
cooperative federalism is not the usual practice. Despite overlap in the aims 
of sections 91 and 92 and the amending procedures, these two parts of the 
Constitution are not often discussed in relation to each other. When they are, 
their relationship is usually described as one of alternatives or competitors – 
both are ways of achieving public policy goals, yet the former is the easier 
route given political realities.4 Rarely are the constitutional amending 
procedures read through the lens of cooperative federalism and rarely is  
Part V looked to as a source of insight into cooperative federalism or the 
interpretation of sections 91 and 92. This article begins to bridge this divide 
in an effort to deepen our understanding of cooperative federalism in 
Canadian constitutionalism. 
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I canvasses recent 
jurisprudential claims about the status and role of cooperative federalism 
in Canadian constitutional law and politics. The cases establish that 
cooperative federalism is identified as a guiding principle of constitutional 
interpretation in division of powers cases and is understood to be an 
instantiation of the more general principle of federalism in modern 
Canada. Part II, the heart of the article, argues that despite the Supreme 
Court’s contention that sections 91 and 92 are the “primary textual 
expression of the principle of federalism in our Constitution”,5 cooperative 
federalism is relevant to constitutional practice and interpretation in 
contexts other than the traditional division of powers. In particular, the 
principle of cooperative federalism finds strong structural expression  
in Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982. Part III of this article considers the 
implications of a structural account of cooperative federalism for the 
division of powers context. It notes that these implications remain to be 
worked out in practice and in the jurisprudence, but wonders whether,  
 
                                                                                                                       
3 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), ss. 91, 92, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, 
App II, No. 5.  
4 P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (5th ed. Suppl), at 5-46, cited in Quebec (AG), 
supra, note 1, at para. 17. 
5 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 47 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Secession Reference”].  
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at a minimum, the principle of cooperative federalism entails a level of 
regard by one legislative actor for the interests of its legislative partners 
when engaged in joint action. In this discussion, I draw on the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Quebec v. Canada (“Quebec (AG)”) as a case 
study.6 In particular, I explore the merits of the dissenting opinion and 
suggest that the principle of cooperative federalism may give rise to legal 
duties beyond those discussed in the judgment. 
This article is not about the value of cooperation as the organizing 
principle of a federation. There are many ways to configure a federal 
relationship, with cooperation as only one possible orienting maxim. 
Such a maxim has virtues as a guide for political and interpretive 
practices. But those virtues will always depend on the context in which 
the cooperative principle is invoked7 and will always have limits.8 
Instead, the normative prescription of this article is found in what it 
counsels for understanding the constitutional architecture. The argument 
is that when we account for Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, we see 
that the roots of cooperation are more firmly grounded in the Constitution 
than the current jurisprudence suggests. 
II. THE STATUS OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM IN DIVISION OF 
POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 
In Canadian constitutional law, cooperative federalism is understood as 
both a descriptive concept and a legal principle.9 As a concept, it describes a 
political phenomenon, one in which agents of the central and regional 
governments develop mechanisms for redistributing powers and resources.10 
As a legal principle, it serves as a guide for constitutional interpretation in 
division of powers cases. Cooperative federalism is to be “given due 
weight”, meaning that sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 
should be read to allow for “interplay, indeed overlap” between spheres of 
federal and provincial authority and to favour “the application of valid rules  
 
                                                                                                                       
6 Quebec (AG), supra, note 1. 
7 Jeremy Webber, The Constitution of Canada: A Contextual Analysis (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2015), at 169-171.  
8 See e.g., Rosalind Dixon and Richard Holden, “Constitutional Amendment Rules: The 
Denominator Problem” in Tom Ginsburg, ed., Comparative Constitutional Design (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), at 195. 
9 Quebec (AG), supra, note 1, at para. 17. 
10 Id., citing Hogg, supra, note 4, at 5-46.  
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adopted by governments at both levels” over enforcing strict jurisdictional 
silos.11 “Canadian federalism is not simply a matter of legalisms”, Justices 
Binnie and LeBel wrote in Canadian Western Bank. Rather, the 
“Constitution, though a legal document, serves as a framework for life and 
for political action within a federal state, in which the courts have rightly 
observed the importance of co-operation among government actors to ensure 
that federalism operates flexibly”.12 
Recent case law shows that cooperative federalism is invoked as “the 
guiding principle” when applying the division of powers doctrines. For 
example, the jurisprudence provides that the doctrine of incidental effects 
should allow for interjurisdictional overlap, as long as each order of 
government is properly pursuing objectives within its jurisdiction.13 
Similarly, the doctrine of paramountcy is to be narrowly construed and 
applied. In the absence of clear evidence, the courts are to avoid broad 
articulations of Parliamentary purpose that would bring federal legislation 
into conflict with provincial statutes.14 As the courts have explained, 
unsupported expansive readings of the purpose of federal legislation 
undermine opportunities for cooperative schemes.15 In addition, the courts 
have tightened the yoke of interjurisdictional immunity in light of 
cooperative federalism. Resorting to interjurisdictional immunity or 
applying it rigorously is inconsistent with the “dominant tide”, that is the 
cooperative tide, of Canadian federalism.16 
Despite the status of cooperative federalism as a “guiding principle” in 
division of powers cases, the jurisprudence confirms that the principle has 
limits. These limits arise when “legislative overlap jeopardizes the balance 
between unity and diversity”.17 If, for example, it is impossible to comply 
with overlapping federal and provincial statutes or if a provincial statute 
frustrates a Parliamentary purpose, the risk of imbalance becomes real and 
                                                                                                                       
11 Saskatchewan (Attorney General) v. Lemare Lake Logging Ltd., [2015] S.C.J. No. 53, 
2015 SCC 53, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 419, at para. 22 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lemare Lake Logging”]; 
Goodwin, supra, note 1, at para. 33. 
12 Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 1, at para. 42. 
13 Goodwin, supra, note 1, at paras. 32-33; Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 1, at para. 28. 
14 Lemare Lake Logging, supra, note 11, at paras. 21, 23. 
15 Id., at para. 23. 
16 Quebec (AG), supra, note 1, at para. 17; Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 1, at para. 37. 
17 Alberta (AG) v. Moloney, [2015] S.C.J. No. 51, 2015 SCC 51, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 327, at para. 16 
(S.C.C.), affg [2014] A.J. No. 155 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter “Moloney”]. Put another way, the limits of 
cooperative federalism arise when its invocation would “override or modify” the balance captured by ss. 91 
and 92: Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, 2011 SCC 66, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837, at para. 61 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Securities Reference”]; Quebec (AG), supra, note 1, at para. 19.  
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the cooperative principle cedes to the doctrine of paramountcy.18 In addition, 
cooperative federalism cannot be used to limit the scope of federal or 
provincial legislative authority or to ground a positive obligation to 
cooperate when the Constitution authorizes unilateral action.19 
The scope of the principle of cooperative federalism was at issue in 
Quebec (AG) and ultimately divided the Court. The main question in the 
case was whether Parliament could unilaterally dismantle the long gun 
registry and destroy the data held within it. The majority held that 
Parliament had this authority. The registry had been validly established 
under Parliament’s jurisdiction over criminal law and could therefore be 
validly dismantled in the same way. According to the majority, Parliament 
was under no constitutional obligation to consult Quebec when repealing the 
registry enactments, to consider the effects on Quebec, or to offer the 
registry data to officials in Quebec.20 Cooperative federalism did not entail 
otherwise. 
The majority in Quebec (AG) conceded that its analysis might have 
been different had the registry been a “truly interlocking federal-provincial 
legislative framework”.21 In contrast, the dissenting judges believed that 
the legislative scheme establishing the registry had already met the 
requisite standard of partnership. On this point, Justices LeBel, Wagner, 
and Gascon, writing jointly in dissent (Abella J. concurring), were of the 
view that the nature of the registry scheme was such that the “interlocking” 
standard had been met. In their view, the federal and provincial actors had 
entered into a true partnership with respect to firearms control and in 
pursuit of both federal (criminal law) and provincial (public safety and 
administration of justice) purposes.22 In looking to the constitutional 
consequences of this intergovernmental partnership, the dissenting judges 
reasoned that the division of powers doctrines had to protect joint schemes 
at both the time of implementation and in the process of dismantling.23 It 
would “hardly make sense”, they wrote, “to encourage co-operation and 
find that schemes established in the context of a partnership are valid while 
at the same time refusing to take this particular context into account when 
those schemes are terminated”.24 
                                                                                                                       
18 See e.g., Moloney, id. 
19 Quebec (AG), supra, note 1, at para. 20. 
20 Id. 
21 Id., at para. 4. 
22 Id., at paras. 115-135. 
23 Id., at para. 152. 
24 Id., at para. 152. 
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What, then, must be accounted for in assessing the constitutional 
obligations attendant upon dismantling a joint legislative scheme? Justices 
LeBel, Wagner, and Gascon ultimately held that the impugned provision of 
the federal legislation dismantling the registry was unconstitutional 
because it was, in pith and substance, outside the federal criminal law 
power and was not justified under the ancillary powers doctrine. However, 
the reasoning of the dissenting judges was informed by the principle of 
cooperative federalism. According to the dissenting opinion, the logic of 
cooperative federalism gives rise to positive obligations on both legislative 
and judicial actors when assessing the constitutionality of legislation. They 
explain that in order to adopt legislation that terminates an 
intergovernmental partnership in a way that is consistent with the principle 
of cooperative federalism, Parliament or a provincial legislative assembly 
must consider the “reasonably foreseeable consequences” of the decision 
to terminate on the other order of government.25 Similarly, when exercising 
their powers of judicial review, the courts must be mindful of the impact of 
the legislation on the partner’s exercise of powers.26 Justices LeBel, 
Wagner, and Gascon were of the view that these obligations flow from the 
principles of cooperative federalism and the separation of powers: 
…a co-operative scheme from which both the federal and provincial 
governments benefit cannot be dismantled unilaterally by one of the 
parties without taking the impact of such a decision on its partner’s 
heads of power into account…. In a co-operative context, actions of a 
government at one level can have serious consequences for the other 
level. It is therefore necessary to show vigilance for the increased risk 
of disrupting the constitutional balance that is protected by the principle 
of federalism. The concern here is not to alter the separation of powers 
in our Constitution through the application of co-operative federalism, 
but to ensure that it is respected.27 
Ultimately, cooperative federalism is concerned with ensuring that 
agents of the federation can respond to social and political realities, which 
do not necessarily fit neatly in the categories imagined by sections 91 and 
92, in the exercise of their respective constitutional authority. As a legal 
principle, cooperative federalism favours interpretations of the division of 
powers that respect and facilitate cooperative intergovernmental efforts.  
In this way, the principle of cooperative federalism counsels expansive  
                                                                                                                       
25 Id., at para. 153. 
26 Id., at para. 153. 
27 Id., at para. 154. 
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(or, from a different perspective, intrusive) interpretations of jurisdictional 
authority. It “permits a government at one level to pass laws that have an 
impact on the powers of the other level”.28 That said, in the ordinary 
division of powers context, the principle of cooperative federalism has no 
positive obligation of cooperation attached; it is permissive. Government 
officials are under no duty to cooperate or to interpret their authority 
expansively when pursuing legislative goals, but the opportunity to do so 
is available. 
Quebec (AG) draws our attention to cases in which federal and 
provincial actors are involved jointly in a legislative scheme and disagree 
about whether and to what degree the scheme should survive. But the case 
law establishes that the principle of cooperative federalism is also invoked 
as the guiding interpretive principle in cases in which the legislative 
scheme under review has no coordinated or joint qualities.29 In such cases, 
even though the impugned scheme is an exercise of unilateral efforts by 
one order of government, the principle of cooperative federalism is still 
called on to guide the constitutional analysis.30 The cases show that the 
principle is consistently in play and is directed at authorizing the overlap 
and interplay of broadly interpreted legislative powers. That said, there 
remains some uncertainty about the scope, status and role of cooperative 
federalism as an interpretive principle in the division of powers context. 
Recent cases that consider the status of cooperative federalism describe 
cooperative federalism as the “modern” or “contemporary” version of 
federalism in Canada.31 On this view, federalism – an assumption 
“inherent in the structure of our constitutional arrangements”32 – sits at 
Canada’s constitutional core, aiming to reconcile diversity with unity, 
police the constitutional division of powers, and maintain a balance 
between federal and provincial powers.33 It is a principle that takes on 
different meanings over time. As Justices LeBel, Wagner and Gascon 
explain in Quebec (AG), the meaning of federalism has changed over the 
course of Canada’s constitutional history: 
[146] According to the “classical” approach favoured by the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council until 1949, the heads of power 
                                                                                                                       
28 Id., at para. 154. 
29 See e.g., Goodwin, supra, note 1; Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 1. 
30 See e.g., Lemare Lake Logging, supra, note 11 and Moloney, supra, note 17. 
31 Quebec (AG), supra, note 1, at para. 147; Goodwin, supra, note 1, at para. 33; Canadian 
Western Bank, supra, note 1, at para. 42. 
32 Secession Reference, supra, note 5, at para. 56. 
33 Secession Reference, supra, note 5, at para. 43; Quebec (AG), supra, note 1, at para. 145. 
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constituted “watertight compartments”, and overlaps between them 
were to be avoided to the extent possible: Reference re Securities Act, 
at para. 56. 
[147] The modern view of federalism rejects this approach and replaces 
it with a more flexible conception of the division of powers that is 
dominant in this Court’s recent jurisprudence. This conception 
“recognizes that in practice there is significant overlap between the 
federal and provincial areas of jurisdiction, and provides that both 
governments should be permitted to legislate for their own valid 
purposes in these areas of overlap”…. Such a conception thus 
facilitates intergovernmental co-operation…. Both in law and in the 
political arena, the concept of “co-operative federalism” has been 
developed to adapt the principle of federalism to this modern reality.34 
On this understanding, federalism is part of the scaffolding around 
which the Constitution is constructed; it cannot be extracted from the 
constitutional order without renovating the constitutional architecture on 
a grand scale.35 Cooperative federalism, on the other hand, has 
constitutional status because it is the prevailing version of federalism 
simpliciter. It is, in other words, fruit of Canada’s constitutional living 
tree. It follows that the character of Canadian federalism can continue to 
evolve by virtue of political practice, prevailing attitudes, legislative 
experience, and so on, into an alternative version – cooperative or 
otherwise. 
The principle of cooperative federalism is an expression of a political 
practice, one shaped by a long constitutional history of approaches to 
interpretation, justification, and limits. There is value in preserving its 
flexibility. The status of the principle of federalism – the “lodestar by 
which the courts have been guided”36 – remains stable; its entrenched 
status is unaffected by changes in its meaning over time. Yet, the case 
law also establishes that the parts of the Constitution of Canada are 
linked and that constitutional meaning must come from the whole.37 This 
                                                                                                                       
34 Quebec (AG), supra, note 1, at paras. 146-7, citing Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS 
Community Services Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, 2011 SCC 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 at para. 62 
(S.C.C.), affg [2010] B.C.J. No. 57 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “PHS”]; Canadian Western Bank, supra, 
note 1, at paras. 36-37; Securities Reference, supra, note 17, at paras. 56, 57-8; and OPSEU v. 
Ontario (Attorney General), [1987] S.C.J. No. 48, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2, at 19-20 (S.C.C.), affg [1980] 
O.J. No. 3863 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “OPSEU”]. 
35 On federalism as a fundamental unwritten principle of the Constitution, see e.g., Secession 
Reference, supra, note 5, at paras. 33-48 and 55-60. 
36 Secession Reference, supra, note 5, at para. 56. 
37 Reference re Senate Reform, [2014] S.C.J. No. 32, 2014 SCC 32, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 704  
at paras. 26-27 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Senate Reform Reference”]. 
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view reflects a structural approach to constitutional interpretation.  
On such a model, an inquiry into the meaning of Canadian federalism 
should look beyond the traditional division of powers realm to other 
parts of the Constitution to gather interpretive insights from the 
constitutional order as a whole. This article takes up just one small part 
of this project – exploring the insights to be learned about cooperative 
federalism by looking beyond sections 91 and 92 to the Canadian 
constitutional amending procedure, to which I now turn. 
III. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND PART V 
This section makes the claim that Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982 
is an expression of cooperative federalism, both as a descriptive concept 
(that is, in what it asks of Canada’s political actors who seek to amend 
the Constitution) and as an interpretive principle (that is, in what it 
requires of our understanding of the many amending procedures set out 
in Part V).38 Not only is joint action required by the amending procedure, 
but the cooperative demands are broad and act as limits on related grants 
of unilateral jurisdiction. The subsections below trace the ways in which 
the amendment context lines up with the descriptive and interpretive 
dimensions of cooperative federalism. The aim is to establish that Part V 
properly belongs in the conversation about cooperative federalism and 
that its claim to this position is strong. 
1. Cooperative Federalism as a Descriptive Concept 
Cooperative federalism describes an aspect of the political practices 
and relationships contemplated by Part V. The demands for coordinated 
action that Part V makes are apparent on the face of the constitutional text. 
Part V sets out a number of amending procedures – multilateral, bilateral, 
and unilateral. The general rule, set out in section 38(1), provides that 
constitutional amendments require the consent (in the form of resolutions) 
of the Senate, the House of Commons, and the legislative assemblies of 
two-thirds of the provinces representing 50 per cent of the population of 
the provinces.39 This general procedure applies to all amendments that do 
                                                                                                                       
38 On federalism as the “unifying principle” of Part V, see Carissima Mathen, “The Federal 
Principle: Constitutional Amendment and Intergovernmental Relations” in Emmett Macfarlane, ed., 
Constitutional Amendment in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), at 65.  
39 Constitution Act, 1982, supra, note 2, s. 38(1). 
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not fall within one of the other (exceptional) procedures, including 
amendments in relation to proportionate representation, the method of 
selecting senators, and the Supreme Court of Canada.40 
The most onerous exception to the general procedure is set out in 
section 41. It requires unanimous consent of the Senate, House of 
Commons and the legislative assemblies of the provinces in order to 
amend the Constitution in relation to some of the most contentious areas 
of constitutional concern, including amendments to the composition of 
the Supreme Court, to the use of English and French, and to the amending 
procedure.41 Section 43 sets out a special procedure for amendments in 
relation to constitutional provisions that apply to some but not all of the 
provinces. These amendments require the consent of the Senate, the 
House of Commons, and the legislative assembly of the provinces to 
which the amendment applies.42 In addition, Part V provides for 
unilateral constitutional amendments at the federal and provincial 
spheres. Section 44 provides that, subject to sections 41 and 42, 
Parliament can unilaterally amend the Constitution of Canada in relation 
to Canada’s executive, the Senate and the House by way of the ordinary 
legislative process. And section 45 provides that, subject to section 41, a 
provincial legislature can unilaterally amend the constitution of the 
province, again by means of the ordinary legislative process.43 
This review of the text of Part V shows that, like sections 91 and 92, 
Part V carves out spheres of authority for legislative assemblies based on 
subject matter and allocates jurisdictional power over those spheres to 
the provincial legislatures, to Parliament, and, for the most part, to 
Parliament and the provinces jointly. This plain reading of the text of Part 
V suggests that the overarching goal of Part V is to establish a code that 
ensures that the orders of government unite in order to amend the 
Constitution in ways that bear on the interests of central and local actors. 
Part V identifies areas of concern that are necessarily of joint interest to 
Parliament and the provinces and requires, as a result of that interest, 
cooperative efforts in order to bring about their reform. As the Supreme 
Court explained in the Senate Reform Reference, the purpose of Part V is 
                                                                                                                       
40 Id., s. 42(1).  
41 Id., s. 41.  
42 Id., s. 43. 
43 On legislative authority to amend the Constitution see Warren J. Newman, “Constitutional 
Amendment by Legislation” in Emmett Macfarlane, ed., Constitutional Amendment in Canada 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), at 105 and Warren J. Newman, “Putting One’s Faith 
in a Higher Power: Supreme Law, the Senate Reform Reference, Legislative Authority and the 
Amending Process” (2015) 34 N.J.C.L. 99. 
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to implement amending procedures “designed to foster dialogue between 
the federal government and the provinces on matters of constitutional 
change”.44 
Cooperative federalism is concerned with upholding the constitutional 
balance of federal-provincial power. It aims to facilitate inter-
governmental coordination in the exercise of constitutional authority. 
And it is directed towards the interpretation of distributions of 
supervisory power over certain spheres of social and political concern to 
the legislatures. If these premises are true, it is difficult to conclude that 
Part V falls outside the ambit of cooperative federalism. Indeed, the 
provisions of Part V immediately draw our gaze to the cooperative 
dimensions of the constitutional relationship between the central and 
regional powers. In its allocation of powers of consent and veto to 
Parliament and the provincial legislatures, the amending procedure 
constitutes a clear manifestation of cooperative federalism in Canadian 
constitutional life, one that relies on practices of negotiation, 
consultation, and ultimately consent, to bring about desired results.45 
2. Cooperative Federalism as an Interpretive Principle 
Cooperative federalism also resonates as a conceptual frame and 
interpretive principle that can make sense of the intricacies of Part V. Indeed, 
the jurisprudence interpreting the amending procedure takes seriously the 
cooperative principle. For example, in the Senate Reform Reference, the 
Supreme Court interpreted the provisions of Part V, recognizing that it had to 
be interpreted as a whole, as the meaning of each provision could be 
discerned only in relation to the others. The interpretive exercise included 
discerning the scope of sections 44 and 45, the unilateral amending 
provisions. Section 44 authorizes Parliament to amend the Constitution in 
                                                                                                                       
44 Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 37, at para. 31. 
45 A challenge to this account could raise the concern that the multilateral provisions of Part 
V only call for agreement amongst legislative actors, not cooperation. The claim here would be that 
Part V contemplates a system of consent, veto, and dissent, rather than a more active process of 
cooperation. On this view, since cooperation and agreement are not the same, Part V is not an 
instance of cooperative federalism any more than the strict approach to the “exclusive” heads of 
power set out in sections 91 and 92. Admittedly, the type of intergovernmental interaction 
contemplated by Part V is political and subject to the wrangling of policy agendas and strategic 
negotiation. However, the political practices that are necessary to achieve the goals of Part V gesture 
to the cooperative dimensions of the contemplated multilateralism. In order to reach the consensus 
needed to formally amend the Constitution pursuant to the multilateral procedures set out in Part V, 
some process of common goal-setting, negotiation, and consent, as between the legislative actors, is 
required, a practice that can be reasonably described as cooperation. 
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certain enumerated circumstances. It provides, “Subject to sections 41 and 
42, Parliament may exclusively make laws amending the Constitution of 
Canada in relation to the executive government of Canada or the Senate and 
House of Commons”. Section 45 is the provincial equivalent, providing, 
“Subject to section 41, the legislature of each province may exclusively 
make laws amending the constitution of the province”. 
The interpretation of section 44 is particularly important for 
determining the scope of the Part V procedures. A broad interpretation of 
Parliament’s unilateral power for Senate reform, for example, would 
necessarily limit the multilateral power to reform the Senate provided for 
in section 42(1). A narrow interpretation of section 44, on the other hand, 
would allow for the multilateral provisions to have wide application. 
When undertaking the interpretive task in the Reference, the Court held 
that section 44 is narrow in scope. The Court drew on the principle 
underlying Part V, which entails joint action by Parliament and the 
provinces in matters of joint concern: 
…ss. 44 and 45 give the federal and provincial legislatures the ability to 
unilaterally amend certain aspects of the Constitution that relate to their 
own level of government, but which do not engage the interests of the 
other level of government. This limited ability to make changes 
unilaterally reflects the principle that Parliament and the provinces are 
equal stakeholders in the Canadian constitutional design. Neither level of 
government acting alone can alter the fundamental nature and role of the 
institutions provided for in the Constitution. This said, those institutions 
can be maintained and even changed to some extent under ss. 44 and 45, 
provided that their fundamental nature and role remain intact.46 
In short, the Court interpreted the unilateral grants of amending power 
narrowly, thereby preserving a broad scope for the amending procedures 
that call for coordinated action. This approach flowed from the Court’s 
recognition that the partners to Canada’s federation are of equal status 
and that there is a need to respect the matters of joint concern set out in 
Part V. In this way, the interpretation of Part V was an instance in which 
the principle of cooperative federalism was implicitly invoked to limit 
the scope of unilateral powers under the Constitution. 
The interpretive significance of the cooperative principle was 
highlighted again when the Court measured the government’s proposals 
for Senate reform against the procedural demands of Part V. In concluding 
that the implementation of consultative elections triggered the general 
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amending formula, the Court reiterated the need for federal and provincial 
officials to act jointly in order to bring about reform that would have a 
qualitative impact on matters of joint concern. The “scope of s. 44 is 
limited”, the Court held. “[I]t does not encompass consultative elections, 
which would change the Senate’s fundamental nature and role by 
endowing it with a popular mandate.”47 
The same was true on the issue of altering the length of a senatorial term 
in office. In arguing that the multilateral procedures did not apply to 
government proposals to change the tenure of senators, the Attorney General 
argued that the multilateral provisions of section 42(1) (i.e., those expressly 
listing categories of Senate reform that required joint action) should  
be narrowly interpreted in light of the grant of unilateral authority over 
Senate reform set out in section 44. The Court rejected this submission. 
While agreeing that the express subject matters listed in section 42(1) could 
not be read beyond their written terms, the Court held that the general 
amending rule, section 38(1), cannot be circumscribed by unilateral powers: 
…the unilateral federal amendment procedure is limited. It is not a 
broad procedure that encompasses all constitutional changes to the 
Senate which are not expressly included within another procedure in 
Part V. The history, language, and structure of Part V indicate that s. 
38, rather than s. 44 , is the general procedure for constitutional 
amendment. Changes that engage the interests of the provinces in the 
Senate as an institution forming an integral part of the federal system 
can only be achieved under the general amending procedure…48 
The Court concluded that section 44 was indeed “an exception” to the 
general procedure and therefore could only apply when the proposed 
measure would not engage provincial interests.49 
The Supreme Court Act Reference offers another example of the 
cooperative principle being invoked in the interpretation of Part V. This 
opinion suggests that joint constitutional interests can impose constraints 
on the exercise of unilateral powers. This time, the unilateral power is 
outside Part V, found in section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which 
authorizes Parliament to constitute, maintain, and organize a general 
court of appeal Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada is constituted by 
virtue of ordinary legislation,50 pursuant to this exclusive federal power. 
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The Court’s task in the Reference was to determine the scope of section 
101 in light of Part V. Recall that sections 42(1)(d) and 41(d) provide that 
constitutional amendments in relation to the Supreme Court must be made 
according to the general procedure and those in relation to the composition 
of the Court require unanimous consent. In undertaking this task, the Court 
relied on a broad interpretation of the cooperative provisions of Part V to 
limit the scope of Parliament’s power under section 101: 
It is true that at Confederation, Parliament was given the authority 
through s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867  to “provide for the 
Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of a General Court of 
Appeal for Canada”. Parliament undoubtedly has the authority under s. 
101 to enact routine amendments necessary for the continued 
maintenance of the Supreme Court, but only if those amendments do 
not change the constitutionally protected features of the Court. The 
unilateral power found in s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 has been 
overtaken by the Court’s evolution in the structure of the Constitution, 
as recognized in Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982.51 
According to the majority of the Court, not only had the evolution of 
the Court’s constitutional status and the entrenchment of cooperative 
authority over reform of the Court narrowed the scope of Parliament’s 
section 101 authority, it had also given rise to a positive obligation on 
Parliament to fulfil that authority. “[W]hat s. 101 now requires”, the 
majority wrote, “is that Parliament maintain — and protect — the 
essence of what enables the Supreme Court to perform its current role.” 
In other words, in light of the cooperative authority set out in Part V, 
Parliament is obligated to respect and preserve the joint interests of the 
federal and provincial actors manifested in the institutional dimensions 
of the Supreme Court of Canada. 
This discussion of the relationships and requirements of the amending 
procedure shows that Part V properly belongs in a conversation about 
cooperative federalism in Canadian constitutional law. Indeed, Part V’s 
expression of the principle of cooperative federalism is strong. As a 
descriptive concept, it provides that with some exceptions, the 
Constitution of Canada can be amended only with some measure of 
federal-provincial consensus, as determined by the subject matter of the 
proposed reform. Realizing that consensus requires coordinated action 
between provincial and federal political actors. The opportunity for 
                                                                                                                       
51 Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, [2014] S.C.J. No. 21, 2014 SCC 21, [2014] 
1 S.C.R. 433, at para. 101 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Supreme Court Act Reference”]. 
(2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d) STRUCTURAL COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM 59 
unilateral reform is limited to matters of concern only to one level of 
government; actors from both orders of government must agree to 
proposals that engage federal and provincial interests. As an interpretive 
principle, the cooperative dimensions of Canadian federalism help to 
delineate the scope of the formal amending procedures. Indeed, the 
cooperative demands of the amending formula suggest that the grants of 
joint jurisdiction in Part V are not to be constrained by broadly 
interpreted unilateral powers. This approach culminates in the default 
amending procedure in Canada, which is, at its core, cooperative. 
Ultimately, Part V imagines a structure of government in Canada in 
which coordination and consensus between orders of government are 
necessary in order to amend the Constitution in relation to issues that are 
of particular importance to the nation. It is not just the case that Part V 
would not make sense without an underlying conception of federalism. 
Rather, it’s the case that Part V would not make sense without an 
underlying conception of a cooperative version of federalism.52 In 
particular, cooperative federalism offers a conceptual frame through which 
to assess the successes and failures of Part V that are linked to both 
descriptive accounts of political unwillingness to exercise multilateral Part 
V authority, and principled analyses of the logic and constitutional 
coherence of Canada’s constitutional amending procedures. The next 
section moves from thinking about cooperative federalism as a way of 
understanding the animating principles and interpretive challenges of Part 
V to a consideration of how insights drawn from Part V can contribute to 
understanding other parts of the Constitution, and in particular, sections 91 
and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. 
IV. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AS CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
The strong claim to cooperative federalism in Part V suggests that the 
principle of cooperative federalism is not simply a matter of political 
practice or brought to life through judicial interpretation of sections 91 
and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Rather, the principle is also 
expressed through the obligations and procedures established by the 
constitutional text and structure of Part V. What does this mean? What 
does it mean to say that cooperative federalism is embedded in the 
                                                                                                                       
52 This picks up on a suggestion about the significance of cooperative federalism in the 
interpretation of Part V in Kate Glover, “Structure, Substance and Spirit: Lessons in Constitutional 
Architecture from the Senate Reform Reference” (2013) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 221, at 232-33.  
60 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
structure of the Constitution, perhaps alongside other forms or 
understandings of federalism? The structural dimensions of the 
constitution take the form of principle, process, institution, and text. 
Together, and in conjunction with the constitution’s substantive claims, 
the constitution’s structural dimensions reflect the vision of government 
that the constitution is intended to implement.53 Further, they refer to the 
basic internal structure of the constitution, that is, the ways the 
constitution and the institutions it imagines are configured, recognizing 
the ways in which the various components of the constitution are linked 
and tethered to each other in various, often shifting, ways.54 
If the constitution aims to realize a particular vision of political life, it 
follows that the constitution should be interpreted with a view to realizing 
and facilitating that vision.55 A structural approach to constitutional 
interpretation draws insights about the meaning of the constitution from its 
architecture. Exercises of constitutional interpretation must account for 
these structural links, as well as the broader institutional frameworks, 
structures, and landscape imagined within them.56 As the Supreme Court 
explained in the Senate Reform Reference: 
The notion of architecture expresses the principle that “[t]he individual 
elements of the Constitution are linked to the others, and must be 
interpreted by reference to the structure of the Constitution as a 
whole”… The assumptions that underlie the text and the manner in 
which the constitutional provisions are intended to interact with one 
another must inform our interpretation, understanding, and application 
of the text.57 
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The vision that underpins the constitution cannot be distilled to a single 
aim or principle. Canada’s constitutional order strives to realize the ideals of 
democracy, the rule of law, federalism, human dignity, judicial 
independence, and more. But the claim of this article is that the vision 
imagined by Canada’s constitution includes, alongside these other principles 
and iterations, an aspiration towards cooperative federalism. This aspiration 
captures the belief that joint action between orders of government is required 
at times in order for constitutional powers and goals to be exercised and 
realized. A constitutional vision shaped in part by cooperative federalism is 
one that accepts that the constitutional balance of the Canadian federation is 
preserved and promoted by the “enactment of co-ordinated federal and 
provincial schemes to better deal with the local needs of unity and 
diversity”.58 It is a vision that respects and values intergovernmental efforts 
as a way of addressing the needs and realities of social and political life. It is 
also a vision that directs our gaze to the insights of cooperative federalism 
across areas and contexts of constitutional interpretation. 
The obvious next question is, what does this approach to constitutional 
interpretation entail? In part, an enriched structural understanding of 
cooperative federalism offers a principled justification for some parts of 
the existing state of the law. For example, the enriched approach provides 
support for considering the principle of cooperative federalism in all cases 
dealing with the interpretation of sections 91 and 92, even in cases in 
which the facts do not disclose deliberate or negotiated joint action 
between orders of government. When intergovernmental relations are 
understood, descriptively and structurally, in cooperative terms, then 
constitutional interpretation should promote and facilitate that vision of 
government, rather than hinder it. Once we accept that the constitution 
aims to implement some form of cooperative government, then we find 
support for an approach to constitutional interpretation that, at a minimum, 
respects and facilitates cooperative intergovernmental relationships. 
On this approach, invoking cooperative federalism as the guiding 
interpretive principle in cases of unilateral action is neither a 
mischaracterization of the nature of Canadian federalism, nor a judicial 
misstep.59 Rather, it is a manifestation of the deep constitutional character 
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of cooperative federalism. In these cases, the reliance on cooperative 
federalism as the guiding interpretive principle can be justified as ensuring 
that the grants of power set out in sections 91 and 92 are interpreted in a 
way that allows for cooperation in present and future cases. In other words, 
cooperative federalism encourages interpretations of unilateral jurisdiction 
through the lens of the cooperative principle, such that future instances of 
cooperation dealing with the same subject matter are available. 
A structural claim to cooperative federalism also lends support to an 
interpretive approach to the division of powers that takes seriously the 
interjurisdictional effects of joint engagement and disengagement. If the 
constitution aims to implement a vision of government that is not only 
federal but also, at least in some capacity, cooperatively federal, then 
some interpretive and practical consequences must flow therefrom. 
The calibration of those consequences, both the duties and limits 
attendant upon cooperative government, will have to be worked out in future 
cases. But history shows that constitutional law and politics are sufficiently 
robust and flexible to ensure that the application and invocation of 
cooperative federalism are attentive to the particularities of context and the 
considerations raised by other constitutional values. In thinking through the 
implications of the embedded status of cooperative federalism in the 
ordinary legislative process, a structural understanding of cooperative 
federalism does not suggest or entail a positive duty on political actors to 
cooperate or to come to the negotiating table in the event that a cooperative 
hand is extended by the other order of government. Such obligations do not 
exist in the strong cooperative context of constitutional amendment, absent 
the obligations of engagement and negotiation in good faith that arise in 
special circumstances such as those contemplated in the Secession 
Reference. Indeed, in the amendment context, the legal requirement for 
consensus, and the political practices needed to bring it about, are engaged 
as soon as contemplated formal action touches on one of the subject matters 
in the multilateral amending procedure in a qualitatively significant way. 
There is no reason why cooperative federalism in the ordinary legislative 
context would or should entail the same approach. Indeed, the argument is 
not that the mandates of cooperation from Part V are transplanted to the 
legislative context. The argument is, rather, that both contexts are shaped by 
and bring life to the same principle; the way in which that principle comes to 
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life in each context will – and should – vary. Indeed, articulating the duties 
attendant upon a relationship between constitutional actors is a familiar 
exercise. This is the bread and butter of the division of powers jurisprudence, 
of the practices and jurisprudence dealing with the Crown’s duty to consult 
with Indigenous people in decision-making that could affect Aboriginal 
rights, and the circumstances addressed in, and following from, the 
Secession Reference. 
That said, if cooperative federalism is a constitutional value to which 
Canada aspires, it is reasonable to conclude that some positive action is 
called for in order to realize that aspiration and, at a minimum, not to 
undermine it. The minimum positive action that can be imagined is an 
obligation, whether in the form of a duty of loyalty or good faith (as is 
relied on in the duty to consult and secession contexts), that would attach 
to the exercise of legislative authority once governmental actors have 
taken formal steps to enter an intergovernmental partnership. As the 
dissenting judges in Quebec (AG) explained, the logic of cooperative 
federalism demands such a minimum duty: 
The dominant tide with respect to the division of powers admits of 
overlapping powers and favours co-operation between the different levels 
of governments. It also supports the validity of schemes established jointly 
through partnerships developed between members of our federation. In our 
opinion, our courts must protect such schemes both when they are 
implemented and when they are dismantled. It would hardly make sense to 
encourage co-operation and find that schemes established in the context of 
a partnership are valid while at the same time refusing to take this 
particular context into account when those schemes are terminated.60 
The dissenting judges’ reasoning reflects the notion, consistent with the 
broad strokes of the Part V context, that once provincial and federal efforts 
are engaged in a common enterprise, there are common interests in the 
management of that enterprise. These interests include, at a minimum, the 
management of the enterprise’s dismantling. As Professor Poirier points out, 
the dissenting opinion in Quebec (AG) reflects a richer account of 
cooperative federalism than the majority is willing to acknowledge. She 
explains that this account is ultimately more consistent with the principles 
established in earlier cases dealing with cooperative schemes: 
The dissenting judges…have sought to deepen the meaning of 
“cooperative federalism”. Having promoted concerted action between 
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orders, and having lowered the “picket fences” which defined the 
original Canadian federal system, they recognise that the judicial 
branch cannot logically slide back to a traditional dualist conception of 
federalism…The minority position is prudent, nuanced [and]…in line 
both with contemporary federal practice, and with jurisprudential 
development.61 
Given the prominent role that cooperative federalism has already been 
given in the interpretation of sections 91 and 92, it is unlikely that the 
way in which the constitutional doctrines are articulated would change to 
accommodate an enriched structural account. The effect would more 
likely be felt in the details, in discerning the contexts in which a 
structural understanding of cooperative federalism has effects and those 
in which it does not. A structural understanding of cooperative federalism 
could likely justify an analysis that goes further than the dissent in 
Quebec (AG) was willing to go, drawing perhaps on comparative 
accounts of federal obligations of loyalty and good faith from other 
jurisdictions and contexts.62 One risk of these positive obligations is, as 
the majority in Quebec (AG) pointed out, that any recognition of a 
positive obligation would act as a deterrent of cooperative action.63 
Taking this further, drawing on experience from the amendment context, 
there is a risk of stalemate and inaction or attempts to do indirectly what 
cannot be achieved – or what is undesirable to achieve — directly. This 
account of the practical realities of Part V and what the practical realities 
might be in the legislative context raises the question as to whether it is 
appropriate or appealing to draw lessons about cooperation from the 
amendment context when the consensus called for in the amending 
formulas has proven to be unworkable in practice. 
This question forces a confrontation with the constitutional elephant 
in the room – the dysfunctional, or perhaps non-functional, nature of the 
amending procedure. This challenge points out that while it is not the 
case that Part V has never been successfully invoked, political realities 
have made doing so difficult. This article argues that despite the 
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obstacles that have characterized attempts at constitutional amendment in 
the past, Part V remains a meaningful interpretive source. First, as 
explained above, the demands of structural interpretation require it. 
Second, the recent absence of political will to engage in constitutional 
negotiations about constitutional amendment does not erode the 
aspiration of multilateralism embedded in the structure of Part V or its 
effects. Given the attention and recognition shown to the amending 
procedures in political rhetoric, it cannot be argued that Part V has gone 
the way of disallowance and thus no longer warrants attention. Third, the 
variability of the duties and expectations that flow from constitutional 
principles mean that there is nothing inherent in the principle that limits 
its capacity to be adapted to the legislative context in a way that is both 
meaningful and not conducive to stalemate. We must expect and call on 
our political actors to embody and pursue constitutional ideals or, 
ultimately, change them. The space for cooperative efforts, whether in 
the constitutional amendment or legislative context, is an opportunity to 
imagine the full range of possible means by which to implement policy 
goals, rather than a burden to lament for its potential pitfalls. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article contends that cooperative federalism has a deeper place in 
the architecture of the Constitution of Canada than is suggested in recent 
Supreme Court jurisprudence. It supports this claim by looking to the 
role of intergovernmental consensus contemplated in Part V of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 and showing that Part V is a strong expression of 
cooperative federalism within Canadian constitutionalism. It argues that 
the “modern view” of federalism in Canada is enriched when it is 
understood as extending beyond the practices and interpretations of 
sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. 
More work remains to be done to further test, contest, and flesh out 
the implications of this claim in the various contexts of constitutional 
interpretation and practice. The historical account of the role of 
cooperative and non-cooperative action in the context of constitutional 
amendment will help to calibrate the scope and weight of the cooperative 
principle in political and interpretive practice going forward. So too will 
accounts of other cooperative and uncooperative dimensions of the 
constitution beyond sections 91 and 92. An obvious example would be an 
accounting of the implications of section 35.1 of the Constitution Act, 
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1982, which provides that before the provisions of the constitution 
dealing with Aboriginal rights are amended, a constitutional conference 
will be held and the Prime Minister will “invite representatives of the 
Aboriginal peoples of Canada to participate in the discussions on that 
item”.64 Moreover, the concerns that accompany a structural account of 
cooperative federalism require further attention. For instance, does this 
account direct the evolution of federalism as an inherent assumption of 
the constitution in any particular ways? And, what are the limits on the 
use of a cooperative claim to establish obligations and expectations for 
political actors? The starting point for exploring these questions and 
concerns in the interpretive sphere could be more reflection on the 
articulation of federalism and the obligations that flow from it in the 
Secession Reference. 
This additional exploration into cooperative federalism as a structural 
principle in Canadian constitutionalism will help to expand on the 
lessons of this article. It is not just that there is something to be learned 
about cooperative federalism when constitutional amendment is brought 
into the mix. There is also something to be learned about constitutional 
amendment from the traditional division of powers context and 
something to learn about that traditional context from experience with 
constitutional amendment. On the one hand, cooperative federalism 
offers a useful frame through which to think about the conceptual 
foundation for the amending procedures and the place of Part V in the 
broader constitutional context. On the other hand, allocations of 
constitutional power outside of the traditional context of sections 91 and 
92 highlight the various ways in which constitutional interests intersect. 
They serve as a reminder that the issues of our political lives often resist 
the categorization as local or national, regional or central. These are 
lessons of structural constitutionalism. The hope is that this focus will 
contribute to ensuring that those powers are interpreted and exercised in 
a constitutionally principled, and structurally sound, way. 
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